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Australia and New Zealand: Separate
States but Path-Dependent
MARIAN SIMMS
Department of Political Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand
ABSTRACT Australia and New Zealand (Aotearoa) have shared almost two centuries of close
relations created through close geographic proximity, shared membership of political
associations, and frequent policy exchange. The relevant context has shifted from the British
Empire and Commonwealth to a rapidly globalizing world under US military hegemony.
Australia and New Zealand were among the early settler colonies of the British Empire and this
article argues that, as such, the settler colonies helped shape the form of the Empire, and
subsequently the Commonwealth. This history created strong, separate, if somewhat similar,
traditions of independent political experimentation. This article explores different models for
explaining the cross-Tasman relationship and concludes that the path-dependent approach works
best. The path was also influenced by external shocks, notably the second world war and Britain’s
moves towards Europe, and it was these shocks that created the necessary ruptures to create
change. The first world war had catapulted Australia and New Zealand towards separate
nationhood, and simultaneously strengthened their cultural and political links. The second world
war pushed Australia towards the USA and led both Australia and New Zealand to develop a
more explicit role as regional leaders in the Pacific. For New Zealand, Britain’s membership of
the European Community created an economic crisis and politico-cultural stresses which are
reverberating still. Such shocks created the preconditions also for closer association, exemplified
in the CER Treaty, which in turn draws upon historical precedents and experiences.
KEY WORDS: Australia, New Zealand, Labo(u)r parties, British Empire, path dependence
Introduction
The complexities of the linkages between Australia and New Zealand (Aotearoa1)
have been widely acknowledged and three main models have emerged since the 1990s
to encapsulate this relationship. The first is the model of Australia and New Zealand
as separate sovereign states, which has been articulated by the political leaderships of
the two countries and by those academics engaged in comparative study (see Castles
et al., 1995; Considine, 2001). This fits with the broad theory that envisions the 19th
century as generating economic and political liberalism that shaped the world into
democratic nations interlinked with powerful trading connections (Ziring et al.,
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2000, ch. 1). The sovereignty model when applied to Australia –New Zealand
relations overstates the autonomy of the two countries, ignoring their shared history
and its continuing impact. This article will explain such shared history in terms of
path dependence. The second model is that of New Zealand as the seventh
Australian state, waiting in the wings while unfinished business from the late 19th
century is completed. Such an approach is strongly identified with the work of Bob
Catley (2001), and seriously underrates the separate nature of the political and
security paths adopted by the two countries. It is, however, a useful corrective to the
tendency by comparative scholars to underrate the policy complexities of Australian
federalism. The third perspective sees Australia and New Zealand as ‘partners’ in
creating a new economic and political region (see Galligan, 2002; Galligan and
Mulgan, 1999). It aligns with the body of scholarship that identifies growing
regionalism as a rational response in the post-cold war globalizing era (Patman,
2001). Galligan et al. (2001) argue that Australia and New Zealand have always
grappled with the forces of globalization, and were created by them. Others (see
Patman and Rudd, 2005) broadly agree but reserve the term ‘globalization’ for the
post-cold war era of instant communications, where there is also a popular
component to the ‘global village’, and prefer to use ‘internationalization’ for the
historical era.
Path Dependence, Settler Societies and the British Empire
In this article I outline a fourth view, which also argues that Australia and New
Zealand should be viewed in an historical institutional context—one that is best
described as path dependent. Path dependence emerged into the humanities from
economics and argues that ‘history matters’ and historical accidents may determine
long-term outcomes (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1996, p. 1). For example, the decision
to build a hut in a particular clearing can lead to the ‘development’ of a major city.
Path dependence analysts, such as Pierson (2000, p. 251), also argue that the positive
feedback of such situations generates ‘increasing returns’ which make ‘switching’ not
only expensive of time and money but ultimately deleterious. Hence timing is
everything. It provides both ‘formative moments’ and other, inopportune, times
when change becomes problematic.
This article argues that the shared path in the case of Aotearoa and Australia is
that of settler societies under the British Empire. The creation of settler colonies was
an accidental contrivance in which the settlers themselves played constructive roles
(Simms, 2004) (in contrast a traditional Empire model sees the centre as creating and
determining the periphery).2 I suggest that the high degree of political and
constitutional autonomy given to the settler societies, drawing on the Durham
Report on Canada (Report on the Affairs of British North America, 1839), enabled
the precocious development of representative democracy in the settler colonies of
Australia and New Zealand. However, it is argued here that path dependence theory
has operated differently in the foreign policy, economic and trade arenas, as
compared with the constitutional and political domains. Under the Durham model
of responsible government, trade, foreign policy and migration were matters to be
left largely in the hands of the imperial government. Economic development was so
closely aligned with trade as to be dealt with in a similar fashion.
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The policy arenas of economics and trade, and foreign affairs and defence,
respectively, have seen deep ruptures. Indeed, historians have conventionally
referred to the ‘darkest days’ of the second world war as a ‘turning point’ in
Australia’s foreign and defence relations (see Edwards, 2001, pp. 175 – 176). The idea
of path dependence also incorporates such crucial moments or crises when change is
thrust upon a society or institution (Pierson, 2000, p. 251).
The political and constitutional arenas show the continuing importance of shared
origins, in spite of temporary differences, largely because of the political complexion
of the government of the day.
Economy and Trade: The Imperial Framework
In the economic and trade arenas Australia and New Zealand were on different but
semi-related paths. There is clear evidence of path dependence but of a conventional
imperial type. Put simply, the economies of both countries were geared towards the
economic and production needs of Britain and British investors. For New Zealand it
will be demonstrated that the economic link with Britain has continued into recent
times. In both countries there was an early recognition of government’s economic
role as a developer and promoter of the economy, albeit within an imperial
framework. The model of self-determination, which fitted the constitutional and
political arenas of both countries, is ill-suited to the economic and trade dimensions.
From the earliest days of the Australian settlement the Governor of New South
Wales, Lachlan Macquarie, developed the merino industry, which was subsequently
exported to New Zealand (Fitzpatrick, 1971). Land policy was the major item on the
colonial governments’ agendas throughout most of the 19th century, followed by
extensive physical infrastructure development, largely underwritten by extensive
government borrowings. Australian export earnings were heavily dependent upon
wool, supplemented by minerals, especially gold (1850s and 1890s).
For these colonies the trade relationship with Britain was a given, but there were
always small trade movements across the Tasman. Free trade within the British
Empire was accepted policy, and when Australia (1904) and later Canada (1925)
developed a protective tariff, the Imperial Preference policy was designed to allow
preferential treatment to the British and Dominion products (Sawer, 1956, p. 245).
Britain’s adoption of a protective tariff during the Great Depression created a crisis
in New Zealand, which promptly demanded tariff ‘preference’ over the other
Dominions, and with the other Dominions wanting strict quotas against the non-
imperial primary products (Sinclair, 1970, p. 260).
In trade, while the cross-Tasman link was significant, it was equally often tense
and overshadowed by other relationships. New Zealand became a market for
Australian exports but it was not a significant source of Australian imports. For
Australia, Japan and the USA were always more important markets. It can be
argued that Australia has moved from an economically ‘dependent’ relationship with
the UK in the 19th and early 20th centuries to a subsequent dependence on Japan
and the USA. This is easily explained by path dependence theory.
American investment in Australia had been growing throughout the first part of
the 20th century. After the second world war the investment link was cemented with
the establishment of the General Motors-Holden plant in South Australia in 1947
Separate States but Path-Dependent 681
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(Dunn, 1984, ch. 7). The trend towards closer economic links only intensified after
the war and the USA’s share of Australia’s exports had doubled from 10% to 20%
by the 1970s and 1980s. Over the same period Britain’s share of exports dropped
from 40% to less than 5% and Japan’s increased from less than 5% to 20%.
Australia’s rich resources-based economy and substantially larger market always
gave it more options than New Zealand.
For New Zealand the fall of Singapore in 1942 was arguably less of a crisis than
the postwar moves by Britain towards the European Economic Community,
culminating in Britain’s full membership of the Community in 1973. New Zealand
was forced to look elsewhere while simultaneously struggling to retain its special
relationship with Britain. Sinclair (1970, p. 295) argues that ‘‘New Zealand has for
years been especially haunted by the prospect of the United Kingdom entering the
European Economic Community . . . for [its] production of butter, cheese and lamb
has been tailored, for eighty years, to fit the demands of British consumers. Its
wealth has rested on its rainy climate, grass all the year round, and British
appetites.’’
In trade terms, by the end of the 20th century Australia had taken over some, but
not all, of Britain’s role as New Zealand’s leading market for exports and as the most
important source of imports—although both countries are dependent on others for
cars, petroleum and pharmaceutical and medical supplies.
Coal and iron are major Australian exports. Japan is a major importer and a
heavy investor in those sectors. In 2004 Australian imports from the USA were
worth US$19.8 billion of a total of US$148 billion. The relationship was celebrated
in 2004 with the passage of Free Trade Agreement legislation through both the
Australian and US legislatures and on 1 January 2005 Australia became the first
developed economy since Canada to be signatory to a free trade agreement (FTA)
with the USA. Australia in the 21st century remains essentially an importer of
manufactured goods and an exporter of unprocessed foods and mining products, as
it was in the 19th century.
Britain’s departure from the scene has undoubtedly led to closer trans-Tasman
trade links as well as to more formal political, institutional and treaty arrangements.
The most significant of these is the Closer Economic Relations (CER) Agreement,
which was passed in 1983. Subsequently the percentage of exports Australia
takes from New Zealand has increased from 14% to 21%. The CER has been
described as ‘‘second only to the European Union in terms of the scope of policies
covered’’ and so successful that by July 1990 ‘‘all of the traditional border
instruments used to restrict imports or promote exports were removed’’ (Lloyd,
2002, pp. 153, 156).
New Zealand’s overseas investment regime is lighter than Australia’s or Canada’s
and Australia also controls most of New Zealand’s media outlets and a large
proportion of its banks. In any case, foreign investment provisions are one of the few
exceptions allowed under the CER to the free movement of capital requirement.
The New Zealand government attends the meetings of Australian ministerial
councils, but not the annual premiers’ conferences (known as the Council of
Australian Governments or COAG since 1992). The ministerial councils comprise
the relevant state, territory and national ministers of the relevant policy area, with
the addition of the New Zealand counterpart. Policy decisions are not binding on
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New Zealand, but there are moves to develop consistent regulatory regimes, most
notably on matters such as food labelling.
This close but asymmetrical connection can be best seen as an indicator of path
dependence, harking back to over 150 years of close direct and indirect connections.
Defence and Foreign Policy
Based on the adage that links flags and trade, broadly similar patterns may be
discerned in defence and foreign policy to those found in economics and trade. As
Britain’s interest shifted away from the Asia Pacific region Australia and New
Zealand, each having its own separate relations with Britain, negotiated somewhat
separate futures. Australia looked to the USA. Australia’s close ties with the USA
and to a lesser extent Japan can be mapped in the terms of treaties, military action
and in high-level visits and leaders’ speeches. The Australia New Zealand United
States (ANZUS) Treaty originally formulated in 1951 has survived on the
Australian –US side to be celebrated as a platform for the ‘‘counter terrorism
partnership’’ of the 21st century (US State Department, 2006a). In March 2006 the
First Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement between the USA, Japan and
Australia was issued, committing the three countries to maintaining the security and
prosperity of the Asia Pacific region and, indeed, of the world. New Zealand was
dropped from ANZUS and other forums by the US Administration of Ronald
Reagan as a result of its decision in 1985 under Labour Prime Minister David Lange
to implement a nuclear-free policy in its own territorial waters. Training links with
the USA have also become ‘‘severely restricted’’ since 1986 (US State Department,
2006b). New Zealand, however, retains training and strategic links with Australia,
and has become more dependent on these since the decision to scrap its air force in
May 2001.
There is an interesting historical parallel with the case of ANZUS and the US
Alliance, whereby New Zealand was part of the Australasian ‘team’ only to break
away. A New Zealand delegation attended the Australasian Federation Convention
of 1891. The New Zealand prime minister and convention delegate, Sir George Grey,
argued ‘‘unsuccessfully’’ that the Bill being drafted by that Convention should be
‘‘submitted to the people of Australia and New Zealand’’ (Crisp, 1955, p. 208).
Contemporaries (e.g. Reeves, 1969) and later scholars (Crisp, 1955, Evatt, 1940)
alike noted the influential character of Grey’s radical ideas. It was also suggested at
the time that, geographically speaking, New Zealand was ‘‘outside the Federal
circle’’ (Reeves, 1969, p. 148). Others have commented on the New Zealand view
expressed at the time that Australians were maladroit at indigenous matters and
would doubtless upset the racial balance achieved in New Zealand (William Russell,
New Zealand Convention delegate, cited in Grimshaw, 2002, p. 3). While it is true
that New Zealand’s provision for special Maori representation was unique and no
similar provisions existed in Australia for Aboriginal Australians, Australian states
were able to control their own franchises after Federation, and presumably could
have been open to Maori political participation. The example of the ‘White
Queensland’ ideology shows us that a racialist ideology can coexist with the
immigration of so-called ‘non-whites’ justified for specific purposes (Megarrity, 2006,
p. 1). Both Victoria and New South Wales considered following the New Zealand
Separate States but Path-Dependent 683
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approach by adopting special seats for Australian Aborigines in the 1980s. And one
strong indicator of Australia’s sensitivity to the race issue as a probable bar to
New Zealand involvement in an Australasian federation was the insertion of a
special clause in the Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902 to provide an open door to
future New Zealand membership. This clause disqualified the ‘coloured’ races of
Australia, Africa and Asia from voting, ‘‘except[ed] New Zealand’’. It is interesting
to note that, while the clause itself made reference to ‘‘Aboriginal natives’’ the act’s
summary note displayed in the margin referred to the ‘‘Disqualification of coloured
races’’ (reproduced in Simms, 2002, p. 9).
It is argued here that advocacy of closer links after federation continued because
of the shared history that had given rise to institutional links via trade unions, for
instance (King, 2003). The Australian Labor Party (ALP) became a strong advocate
of ‘‘closer political, industrial and commercial relations . . . between the two
countries’’ (Crisp, 1955, p. 101). Closer links between the two nations also provided
a counter to Imperial Federation, widely perceived in Labor circles as a conservative
model, which would be potentially disastrous for the White Australia ideal. White
Australia was a core plank of the first Labor Party platform in New South Wales in
1891 (Clark, 1957). It should be noted that in ALP debates White Australia was
largely seen in terms of so-called ‘coloured’ immigration, not opposition to labour or
voting rights for Aborigines.
Imperial Federation had originally surfaced in the Australasian colonies in the
final decades of the 19th century and, with a few notable exceptions, only received
muted support within Australia, and possibly even stimulated serious discussion of
federation by the New South Wales and Victorian premiers (see Martin, 1980,
p. 383). The first Colonial Conference held in London in 1887 provided Alfred
Deakin, the Victorian Chief Secretary, with the opportunity to criticise the British
for giving ‘‘the Islands of the Pacific to the French, and Samoa to the Germans’’
(La Nauze, 1965, p. 94).3 The Conference—the precursor of the Commonwealth
Heads of Government Meetings—formally decided that the Australian colonies
should have responsibility for British (i.e. southeastern) New Guinea and contribute
to the upkeep of the British naval vessels at the Australian station under a 10-year
agreement. The Australasians continued to press Britain to take control of the
Pacific Islands, especially Samoa and the New Hebrides, where there was
competition with Germany and France, respectively, as they had earlier vigorously
protested when Germany annexed northeastern New Guinea in 1884.
Meanwhile the New Zealand Prime Minister, Richard Seddon, floated a more
ambitious plan for a separate Pacific federation involving Hawaii, Fiji, Tonga,
Samoa and the Cook Islands (King, 2003, p. 292). His successor, Sir Joseph Ward,
with Deakin’s strong support, revived the imperial federation idea in the first decade
of the 20th century (Sinclair, 1970, p. 220).4 Ward’s subsequent call for an ‘Imperial
Parliament of Defence’ received little support, but his strong belief in New Zealand’s
imperial role resulted in the passage of the New Zealand Defence Act 1909, which
constructed a territorial force based on compulsory military training (King, 2003,
p. 292).
The South African war had been an important proving ground for the Australian
and New Zealand colonies. It signified the success of the amateur soldier idea,
allowed Australian politicians to hone their racialist imagery (Barton, 1900) and
684 M. Simms
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demonstrated those colonies’ potential for military action (Crawford and
McGibbon, 2003). It increased the confidence of New Zealand’s imperial
federationists, who developed the idea of a mini-imperialist role in the Pacific
within the British imperial context. Their attempts at annexation of nearby German
colonies in 1905 (Western Samoa) had failed thanks to British Foreign Office
opposition. However, the Cook Islands were handed over by the British to New
Zealand in 1901 (Sinclair, 1970, p. 225). It is interesting to note that Queensland’s
attempt to annex southeastern New Guinea in 1883 was also prevented by the
Foreign Office.5 Queensland eventually saw the solution to its security in an
Australian federation for which it was prepared to jettison its peculiar form of
indentured Pacific labour known as ‘blackbirding’.6
The first world war was ushered in with vigour by the political leaderships of
Australia and New Zealand—demonstrating their commitment to the British Empire.
Australia’s Labor Prime Minister, Andrew Fisher, promised support to the ‘last man’
and the ‘last shilling’. The high proportion of war deaths in the rural communities of
Australia, New Zealand and Canada demonstrated the depth of support for Britain
and provided the platform for their contribution to the postwar peace talks.7 The war
also deepened the connection between Australia and New Zealand in their shared
contribution to the attempt to capture the Dardanelles in 1915.
Imperial Federation was shelved because of the first world war and re-emerged
soon after, so much so that the ALP reaffirmed its traditional opposition at its first
postwar conference (Crisp, 1955, p. 101). The conference cabled to Arthur
Henderson of the British Labour Party, as well as to its own ‘lost’ leader, Prime
Minister Hughes (then in Britain), its emphatic opposition to any move for Imperial
Federation. Now it seemed more than ever a move in the wrong direction when a
League of Nations was the dernier cri.
The League of Nations fuelled the regional ambitions of Australia and New
Zealand. New Zealand accepted the German surrender in Western Samoa on
29 August 1914, and in 1920 it became a Class C Mandate under a decision of the
League of Nations; in 1946 the relationship was changed to a United Nations
trusteeship. Australia gained Nauru and Northeast New Guinea as Class C
mandates under the same League of Nations processes.8
Yet these regional ambitions were consistent with New Zealand’s loyal member-
ship of the broader imperial project from the perspective of the centre-right Reform
Party. The New Zealand Prime Minister Massey had earlier denied that New
Zealand and the other Dominions were sovereign states. The Dominions, he argued:
‘‘had . . .merely entered into a ‘partnership’ with Great Britain for the management
of ‘the British Empire as a single, undivided unity’’’ (Sinclair, 1970, p. 246).
New Zealand’s first Labour government, elected in 1935, saw the League as a
genuine forum for the solution of international aggression and had called for
sanctions against Italy’s move into Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and the Japanese invasion
of China (Harrop, 1950).
Some sections of the Australian labour movement, however, were moving in an
opposing direction. They accepted sovereignty but were nervous about the potential
for some of the other newly established international authorities—such as the
International Labour Organisation (ILO)—to impinge upon Australian sovereignty
regarding tariffs or immigration. Labor, which originally had been agnostic over fiscal
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policy, had developed in concert with progressive Liberals a policy called New
Protection, which established machinery for extensive tariffs and for arbitration and a
fair wage policy. Labor was still strongly committed to a White Australia policy.
Australia and especially New Zealand were slow to sign up to the British Statute
of Westminster (1931), which formalized the ‘autonomous’ status of Dominions
as originally outlined in the Balfour Declaration (1926). Australia ratified the
Act under a Labor government (1942) and likewise New Zealand soon afterwards
(1947).
The ALP, however, quickly became a strong supporter of the British
Commonwealth of Nations, or the fourth empire, as it was termed, and the wartime
Labor government of John Curtin advocated the establishment of a permanent
Commonwealth Secretariat. Canada and South Africa were slower to come around
to the idea. Labor pressed a full employment and reconstruction agenda at the 1944
London conference of British Commonwealth prime ministers, the 1944 Philadelphia
conference of the ILO and the 1945 San Francisco conference of the new United
Nations (Crisp, 1955, p. 104). Both Australia and New Zealand under Labor
governments played important roles in the UN’s early days. Australia’s H. V. Evatt
was President of the General Assembly in 1948 – 49. New Zealand’s Peter Fraser was
chair of the drafting process of the trusteeship section of the UN Charter (King,
2003, p. 407).
The cross-Tasman Labor governments of John Curtin and Peter Fraser had
negotiated the Australia –New Zealand Agreement (ANZA), also known as the
ANZAC or Canberra Pact, in 1944. It was designed to provide a consultative
framework for the future of Pacific countries, especially those former possessions of
the defeated Axis powers. According to Australia’s official war historian, Paul
Hasluck (1970, p. 485), Australia would have principal responsibility for the
Southwest Pacific and New Zealand would be involved in ‘policing’ the South
Pacific—and it was assumed that the USA would wish to ‘‘undertake a substantial
share of responsibility’’ for policing islands north of the Equator.
Opinions differed. Crisp, who served as head of J. B. Chifley’s Department of
Post-War Reconstruction, praised the Agreement as a valuable act of regional
cooperation, whereas prominent New Zealand historian Sinclair castigated it as a
‘conceit’, the Monroe doctrine of the Pacific, and Australian ‘chauvinism’. Sinclair
also indicated his distaste for the perpetuation of ‘neo-colonialism’ against the
inhabitants of the Pacific.
The variations between accounts of this highly significant trans-Tasman
cooperative venture reflect the national and possibly political loyalties of their
writers. New Zealander Michael King (2003), while supportive of the Pact and the
Commission, frankly describes the Australian prime minister’s annoyance at New
Zealand’s refusal to recall its Middle East Division to the Pacific region after the fall
of Singapore. The New Zealand parliament had pondered this in a secret session but
then firmly announced its decision to remain loyal to Britain (Hasluck, 1970,
p. 199).9 Australia’s decision to withdraw the Ninth Division from the Middle East
was made despite the strongest US and British opposition.
Clearly there were tensions over foreign and defence policy but both countries
were on the same side and worked closely in negotiating a new postwar security
framework for themselves and ‘their’ region.
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The ANZA Pact had foreshadowed the South Pacific Commission (1947), which
also involved contributions from the USA, Britain, the Netherlands and France for
Pacific postwar reconstruction. It was to develop a broader role in promoting aid
and stability in the region.10 The South Pacific Forum was established in 1971
following the initiative of several Pacific nations, notably Fiji and Western Samoa,
which had established the Pacific Islands Producers’ Association (PIPA) in 1965,
largely to coordinate trade with New Zealand (Palmer, 1996, p. 221). The Forum
(known as the Pacific Islands Forum since 2000) acted as a regional heads of
government meeting dealing with trade, but also political matters, notably
opposition to French nuclear testing in the South Pacific. Australia’s role was to
prove crucial in creating the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty in 1985, with
New Zealand compromising on the total nuclear ban it preferred.11 Australia
and New Zealand continue to cooperate in policing the Pacific and, since the late
1990s, have engaged in peacekeeping activities in both Bougainville and Solomon
Islands.
A crucial backdrop to Australian and New Zealand defence and security activities
in the Pacific region was the ANZUS Pact (1951). Australia’s call to the USA in
December 1941 can be viewed as part rupture with the past and part continuation of
a previously close connection with that country, which was always significantly
closer than the one between New Zealand and the USA. The most obvious
dimension was economic.
Australia’s relationship with the USA became even warmer with the election of the
centre-right coalition government of John Howard in 1996. Australia had sent
troops to the first Gulf war and, while it was undertaken with the backing of the UN
Security Council, the second war commenced without such consent. Australia, under
Prime Minister Howard, had become part of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ in 2001.
Howard had been in Washington on a state visit at the time of the attack on the
New York twin towers and within hours was interviewed on Sydney talk back radio
pledging support and friendship for the besieged USA. The US alliance was an issue
during the 2001 and 2004 Australian election campaigns (Simms and Warhurst,
2005). The coalition’s strong opposition to terrorism was contrasted with the Labor
opposition’s alleged softness and was to prove decisive in the narrow coalition
victory.
New Zealand, in contrast, and in keeping with the approach initiated by war-time
prime minister Peter Fraser, has preferred to work through UN-backed multilateral
endeavours, sending peacekeeping troops to Sinai, Angola, Cambodia, Somalia,
Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan. It sent an engineering team to Iraq. It has
retained involvement in the Five Power Defence Arrangements, which also include
Australia, the UK, Malaysia and Singapore. Unlike Australia, where defence and
security matters have dominated election campaigns, New Zealand electoral politics
have displayed bipartisan support for the broad direction of New Zealand’s defence
and foreign policy.
Politics
In the cases of political and constitutional reform the periphery exported democratic
practices back to Britain, as well as sharing political ideas and models between them,
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such as proportional representation, and special rights such as voting tickets for
miners and itinerant workers (see Simms, 2006). The longer-term impact was crucial,
so that both societies have continued to be innovators and experimenters politically
and constitutionally.
The settler societies also utilized this autonomy to deal with multiple identities.
This was clearly foreshadowed by Federation leaders, such as Australia’s Edmund
Barton (1898), who anticipated the voters of the several states retaining their existing
rights via membership of the Commonwealth of Australia, within the broad context
of the British Empire. New Zealand steadfastly grappled with the Maori issue. The
terms of the Treaty of Waitangi (1840) were not properly implemented, leading to
the Maori wars. The first real constitution (1852) ignored the Maori, and it was not
until the reconstitution of the political system that separate Maori seats were
established in 1867.12
The sharing of policies between the colonies had been a reality since the establish-
ment of responsible government in the Australian and New Zealand colonies from
the mid-1850s. The early establishment of democratic government in Australia and
New Zealand also carried with it the idea of colonial self-determination. For
example, the secret ballot—a litmus test of democracy—was introduced in the
Australian colonies consequent upon responsible government in the mid-1850s and
copied in New Zealand in 1870.
Democratic self-determination at times meant a stronger identification with the
British Empire and at other times a stronger identification with the colony, as we saw
in the previous section of this article. The Australian and New Zealand colonies
pushed the boundaries of the Durham model, especially the aspect that left
immigration and foreign affairs and trade to the British government. For example,
the desire by Australia and New Zealand to regulate Chinese immigration from the
1860s led to conflict with the Colonial Office, given possible complications in British
relations with China. Imperial federation, favoured by some colonial Liberals,
provided a frame for local ambitions in the Pacific. Both countries were to develop
strong Labor parties, and in the Australian case, where Labor was established in the
1890s, its ideology focused on nationalism not imperialism.13 Into the 20th century
the centre-right parties in both countries tended to identify more with the imperial
project (Sawer, 1956, p. 245).
There are other important connections. The essentially one-way movement of
people from New Zealand to Australia became an issue for policy makers on both
sides of the Tasman. Since 1984 Australia has exempted New Zealand citizens from
its tightly policed points-based system of immigration (see Jupp, 1997). From this
year British subjects were denied their previous entitlements to the benefits of
Australian citizenship, including the right to vote and to stand for parliament. While
New Zealand and Australia have maintained the automatic rights to mutual
permanent residence that common British subjecthood historically conferred, the
benefits differ considerably. For example, on the New Zealand side permanent
residence creates the full entitlements of economic, political and social citizenship for
Australians, whereas the Australian government has since 1984 distinguished
between the entitlements created by permanent residence and citizenship. Since 1984
only full Australian citizenship—first established in 1949—guarantees political
rights.
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Differing attitudes towards the foundation of citizenship rights indicate the
‘separate’ aspects of the paths taken by the two countries since the demise of British
subjecthood. New Zealand’s approach is more inclusive, and on certain aspects of
immigration its attitude is more open. A notable example was the willingness of New
Zealand to house a substantial proportion of the asylum seekers from the MV
Tampa in 2001 under the so-called ‘Pacific solution’. New Zealand’s approach
derived from humanitarianism rather than support for the Australian policy.
By 2005 several of the Tampa families had taken out New Zealand citizenship. New
Zealand has a substantial body of human rights legislation broadly based on the
Canadian model, but falling short of the full Canadian Charter. The rights of the
indigenous Maori people have been developed through a variety of mechanisms and,
although not always successful, have generated debate and given rise in the 2005
elections to an important Maori Party.
Conclusions
From the time of the development of responsible government in the 1850s the former
Australian and New Zealand colonies quickly developed a sense of relative
autonomy in the political and constitutional arenas and on key issues such as
immigration and indigenous peoples. At times they even struggled over foreign
policy with Britain to achieve their own ends. Ironically, their similar origins as
settler colonies, while involving considerably policy sharing, also led ultimately to
separate statehood and at times divergent foreign policies.
For Australia this was self-determination in achieving and maintaining a White
Australia policy, and for both Australia and New Zealand the capacity to flex their
muscles in their own perceived spheres of influence. These aims were spelled out
clearly in the Canberra Treaty (1944). The Treaty was crucial, for it marked the shift
away from Britain in terms of regional foreign policy. Subsequently the ANZUS
Treaty (1951) marked the shift from the British umbrella to an American one, at
least in foreign policy terms.
In trade and economic policies, as well as in defence and foreign policy,
both nations started out as British satellites. The external shocks created by the
decline of the British Empire were handled very differently. For Australia the flag
followed trade and investment with the USA; New Zealand’s trade connection was
always more heavily dependent on Britain. Their economic development was
contextualized by the British Empire. Their differing histories have moulded
distinctive responses to globalization. Australia interprets globalization as a US-
dominated process, whereas New Zealand sees it as an opportunity for small nations
to diversify economic and other relations. Yet both countries have a history of
managing complex, multiple loyalties that are not part of a simple nation state
model—New Zealand’s biculturalism and Australia’s federalism—nor a simple
imperial one.
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Notes
1. Aotearoa means land of the long white cloud and is a term traditionally used by the Maori to refer to
New Zealand.
2. This includes those such as Ferguson (2003), who argues the British Empire was a positive force for
peace and development, and critics such as Howe (2003), who argue empires are destructive.
3. The British had already negotiated treaties with Fijian leaders and Fiji became a Crown Colony
in 1874. Britain gained Tonga and the Solomon Islands as protectorates in 1900, after the
Treaty of Berlin, which also carved up Samoa between the Americans and the Germans (Western
Samoa).
4. Deakin had attended the first Colonial Conference in London in 1887 hosted by the British Colonial
Office and at which defence and communications matters were discussed. Imperial federation was on
the informal agenda of colonial delegates (La Nauze, 1965, p. 88).
5. Britain made southeastern New Guinea (Papua) a British Protectorate in 1884.
6. Queensland was divided over the federation question and the plantation north saw that federation
would probably mean the end of ‘blackbirding’. Blackbirding was a process of brining—probably
forcibly—the inhabitants of Vanuatu and the Solomons to work in the plantations of Queensland and
parts of Northern New South Wales.
7. Those talks also catapulted the Australian Prime Minister William Morris (‘Billy’) Hughes, known as
that ‘fiery little Welshman’ on to the international stage. Hughes had emigrated from Britain to the
Australian colonies as a young person.
8. Class C Mandates were ‘‘to be administered by the mandatory as integral parts of its territories,
subject to safeguards in the interests of the indigenous population’’ (Palmer, 1996, p. 225). West New
Guinea had been a Dutch colony since 1828.
9. According to Hasluck (1970, p. 199) this decision was made after strong representations by Winston
Churchill.
10. The Netherlands left in 1962.
11. The signing of the Treaty of Rarotonga to establish the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone came soon
after the attack on the Rainbow Warrior. According to historian Michael King (2003, p. 445):
‘‘The cause of conservation and the movement to ban nuclear weapons from the South Pacific were
boosted in July 1985 when agents of the French secret service (the DGSE) bombed and sank the
Greenpeace organization’s flagship vessel Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbour’’.
12. The first constitution, proclaimed in 1853, also failed to provide for ministers and gave executive
power to the Governor. In 1875 a new constitution came into force that provided for ministerial
government (Reeves, 1950, ch. 14).
13. There was much policy sharing between the labour movements and parties of the two countries.
The early collectivist policies of New Zealand of the 1890s were regularly reported in the main
labour union paper The Worker, which referred to New Zealand as ‘Maoriland’. Australians Bob
Semple and Paddy Webb provided the leadership of the New Zealand miners’ unions in the early 20th
century.
References
Barton, E. (1898) Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Conventions Third Session,
pp. 1765 – 1766 (Melbourne: Government Printer).
Barton, E. (1900) Untitled speech on Federation, Sir Edmund Barton Papers, National Library of
Australia MS51, available online at: http://nla.gov.au/nla.ms-ms51-5-977-s3
Castles, F. G., Gerritsen, R. and Vowles, J. (Eds) (1995) The Great Experiment: Labour
Parties and Public Policy Transformation in Australia and New Zealand (Auckland: Auckland
University Press).
Catley, B. (2001) Waltzing with Matilda: Why New Zealand Should Join Australia (Wellington: Dark
Horse Publications).
Clark, M. (Ed.) (1957) Sources in Australian History (Melbourne: Oxford University Press).
Considine, M. (2001) Enterprising States: The Public Management of Welfare-to-Work (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press).
690 M. Simms
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 2
2:2
7 2
5 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
1 
Crawford, J. and McGibbon, I. (2003)One Flag, One Queen, One Tongue: New Zealand, the British Empire
and South Africa (Auckland: Auckland University Press).
Crisp, L. F. (1955) The Australian Federal Labour Party (Melbourne: Longmans, Green & Co.).
Dunn, M. (1984) Australia and the Empire: From 1788 to the Present (Sydney: Fontana/Collins).
Edwards, P. (2001) Curtin, MacArthur and the ‘surrender of sovereignty’: a historiographical assessment,
Australian Journal of International Affairs, 55(2), pp 175 – 185.
Evatt, H. V. (1940) Australian Labour Leader: The Story of W. A. Holman and the Labour Movement
(Sydney: Angus & Robertson).
Ferguson, N. (2003) Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (London: Penguin).
Fitzpatrick, B. (1971) The British Empire and New South Wales, 1873 – 1933 (Sydney: Sydney University
Press).
Galligan, B. (2002) Closer political association: Australia and New Zealand, in A. Grimes, L. Wevers and
G. Sullivan (Eds), States of Mind: Australia and New Zealand 1901 – 2001, pp. 295 – 305 (Wellington:
Institute of Policy Studies).
Galligan, B. and Mulgan, R. (1999) Asymmetric political association: the Australasian experiment, in R.
Agranoff (Ed.), Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal Systems, pp. 57 – 72 (Baden Baden:
Nomos).
Galligan, B., Roberts, W. and Trifiletti, G. (2001) Australians and Globalisation: The Experience of Two
Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Grimshaw, P. (2002) Indigenous men, white mothers and ‘founding fathers’, Australia and New Zealand,
1901, in A. Grimes, L. Wevers and G. Sullivan (Eds), States of Mind: Australia and New Zealand
1901 – 2001, pp. 17 – 34 (Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies).
Harrop, A. J. (1950) Part Two, added chapters in new edition of W. Pember Reeves, The Long, White
Cloud, Ao Tea Roa (London: George Allen & Unwin).
Hasluck, P. (1970) Australia in the War of 1939 – 1945: The Government and the People, 1942 – 1945
(Adelaide: Griffin Press in association with the National Library of Australia).
Howe, S. (2003) American empire: the history and future of an idea, Open Democracy, internet journal at
www.opendemocracy.net/debates, 12 June 2003, pp. 5 – 6.
Jupp, J. (1997) Tacking into the wind: immigration and multicultural policy in the 1990s, Journal of
Australian Studies, 53, at www.api-network.com/articles/index.php?jas53_jupp
King, M. (2003) The Penguin History of New Zealand (Auckland: Penguin).
La Nauze, J. A. (1965) Alfred Deakin: A Biography (Carlton: Melbourne University Press).
Liebowitz, S. J. and Margolis, S. (1996) Path dependence, published at http://wwwpub.utdallas.
edu*liebowit/palgrave/palpd.html
Lloyd, P. J. (2002) Completing CER, in A. Grimes, L. Wevers and G. Sullivan (Eds), States of Mind:
Australia and New Zealand 1901 – 2001, pp. 153 – 178 (Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies).
Martin, A. W. (1980) Henry Parkes: A Biography (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press).
Megarrity, L. (2006) ‘White Queensland’: the Queensland government’s ideological position on the use of
Pacific island labourers in the sugar sector 1880 – 1901, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 52(1),
pp. 1 – 12.
Palmer, A. (1996) Dictionary of the British Commonwealth and Empire (London: John Murray).
Patman, R. (2001) Globalisation and trans-Tasman relations: integration or divergence?’Australian
Journal of International Affairs, 55(3), pp. 389 – 402.
Patman, R. and Rudd, C. (Eds) (2005) Sovereignty under Siege? Globalization and New Zealand
(Aldershot: Ashgate).
Pierson, P. (2000) Increasing returns, path dependence and the study of politics, American Political Science
Review, 64(2), pp. 251 – 267.
Reeves, W. Pember (1950) The Long White Cloud, Ao Tea Roa (London: George Allen & Unwin).
Reeves, W. Pember (1969) State Experiments in Australia & New Zealand (South Melbourne: Macmillan)
(reprint of 1902 edition).
Report on the Affairs of British North America (1839) (Toronto: Robert Stanton).
Sawer, G. (1956) Australian Federal Politics and Law (Carlton: Melbourne University Press).
Simms, M. (2002) A Hundred Years of Women’s Politics, Occasional Paper 1 (Canberra: Academy of the
Social Sciences in Australia).
Simms, M. (2004) Empire and democracy? The view from settler societies, Professorial lecture, University
of Otago, Dunedin.
Separate States but Path-Dependent 691
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 2
2:2
7 2
5 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
1 
Simms, M. (2006) From the Hustings to Harbour Views: Electoral Institutions in New South Wales,
1856 – 2006 (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press).
Simms, M. and Warhurst, J. (Eds) (2005) Mortgage Nation: The 2004 Australian Election (Perth:
Australian Public Intellectuals Network, in conjunction with the Academy of the Social Sciences in
Australia and the Curtin University Press).
Sinclair, K. (1970) A History of New Zealand (London: Penguin).
US Department of State (2006a) Australia, at www.state.gov/ra/pa/scp/2006/62989.htm
US Department of State (2006b) New Zealand, at www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35852.htm
Ziring, L., Riggs, R. and Plano, J. (2000) The United Nations: International Organization and World
Politics (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt College Publishers).
692 M. Simms
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 2
2:2
7 2
5 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
1 
